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California's Environmental Quality Act-
A Significant Effect Or Paper Pollution?
The legislature's adoption of the Environmental Quality Act of
1970 created the necessary machinery whereby environmental pro-
tection shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions. This
comment discusses the origins of the Act and its relation to the
National Environmental Policy Act, the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act in Friends of Mammoth v. Board
of Supervisors, and the recent amendments to the Act which have
significantly expanded its scope. Finally, an analysis of several of
the potential problems with the Act and recent legislative and
judicial attempts at clarification is provided.
Man no longer enjoys the margin of error that space, time and
relative lack of power once provided for his ecological miscal-
culations. These mistakes may be cumulative-and irreversible.'
In 1970 the California Legislature enacted the Environmental
Quality Act of 1970 (CEQA) which establishes a broad state policy
aimed at protecting and enhancing the environmental quality of the
state.2 On September 21, 1972, in Friends of Mammoth v. Board
of Supervisors' (hereinafter referred to as Friends of Mammoth) the
California Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of CEQA to re-
quire that state and local governmental agencies file an environmental
impact report for all projects, both public and private, which require a
governmental permit, lease, or other entitlement for use, if such acti-
vities may have a significant effect on the environment. This decision,
one of the first to construe the provisions of CEQA,4 left local gov-
ernmental agencies, lenders, and private developers struggling to deter-
mine the scope of its mandate. The court addressed several of their
1. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY GENERAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE, REPORT OF ASSEM-
BLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF
RIGHTS 18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS]. This report
proposed California's Environmental Quality Act of 1970.
2. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21000 et seq., enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433,
at 2780.
3. 8 Cal. 3d 1, 500 P.2d 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972).
4. On September 12, 1972, the First District Court of Appeals construed the re-
quirements of CEQA regarding the function of a local agency and the courts in re-
viewing an environmental impact report, and the content and sufficiency of an environ-
mental impact report. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water
District, 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972).
1974 / California's Environmental Quality Act
questions in its modified opinion of November 6, 1972.5 How-
ever, the major attempt to clarify the supreme court's holding came
with the legislature's enactment of Assembly Bill 889, which be-
came effective on December 5, 1972.6 Although Assembly Bill 889
significantly amended CEQA and resolved several of the questions
raised by the Friends of Mammoth decision, a number of practical
problems of transition to the new law, as well as some uncertainty
over the implications of the Friends of Mammoth holding, Assembly
Bill 889, and CEQA itself, still persist.
This comment will review the history and content of CEQA in
comparison to the National Environmental Policy Act and the effect
of the Friends of Mammoth decision on CEQA. Next, a summary
of the provisions of Assembly Bill 889 will be provided, and finally
Assembly Bill 889 and CEQA will be analyzed with respect to several
potential problems facing those concerned with California's environ-
mental policy.
ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY ACT OF 1970
A. Policy Provisions
California's Environmental Quality Act of 1970 is essentially pat-
terned after the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) passed
by Congress in 1969.1 The broad purpose of NEPA is to "declare
a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable har-
mony between man and his environment ... ."s To accomplish this
purpose, NEPA mandates all federal agencies and officials to "develop
methods and procedures . . .which will insure that . . .environ-
mental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration
in decision making . . . ."9 To insure implementation of this policy,
Section 102 of NEPA "authorizes and directs that, to the fullest ex-
tent possible . . . the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with
the policies set forth in this Chapter . . . ."10 Thus it appears that
5. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, as modified on denial of re-
hearing, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
6. CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2270.
7. 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. (1970). For a discussion of the application of the
NEPA, see CouNcnL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-THItE
THIRD ANNiAL REPORT 221-67 (Aug. 1972) [hereinafter cited as CoUNcIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALIY]. See also Powell, The Courts as Protectors of the Environment,
47 L.A. BAR. BULL. 215 (1972); Note, Retroactive Application of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 22 HAST. LJ. 805 (1971); Note, A Panoramic View
of the National Environmental Policy Act, 16 How. L.J. 116 (1971).
8. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1970).
9. 42 U.S.C. §4332(B) (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970).
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federal agencies have little, if any, discretion regarding compliance
with the substantive and procedural provisions imposed by NEPA."1
In comparison, CEQA as originally enacted in 1970 was a stripped-
down version of NEPA. It contained broad statements concerning
environmental policy objectives, but failed to specifically define and
delineate the application of its provisions.1 2  As the First District Court
of Appeals stated in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside
County Water District, "[to be sure, the effectuating sections of the
act are less heroic than is the declaration of policy. . .. "18
Basically, CEQA provides that all agencies of the state government
which regulate the activities of private individuals, corporations, and
public agencies that affect the quality of the environment shall regulate
such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing en-
vironmental damage.14 When proposing, planning, or taking action
which has or could have a significant effect on the environment, gov-
ernmental agencies at all levels must develop standards and procedures
designed to insure the bona fide consideration'5  of (1) qualitative
factors, (2) economic and technological factors, (3) long-term, as
well as short-term, benefits and costs, and (4) alternatives to the pro-
posed action.16 These general and broad provisions form the basis
of Califonia's environmental policy.
B. Operative Provisions
Prior to the decision in Friends of Mammoth and the enactment
of Assembly Bill 889, the operative language of CEQA required all
state17 and localI8 agencies to prepare an environmental impact report
(EIR) for proposed projects which could have a significant effect on
the environment." , This provision is similar to Section 102() of
11. See Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 1 ENv. L. REP. 50035, 50037 (1971).
12. CAL. PuB. Rrs. CODE §21000 et eeq., as enacted, CAL. STATs. 1970, c. 1433,
at 2780.
13. 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 701, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197, 200 (1972).
14. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21000(g). The court in Friends of Mammoth re-
lied heavily on this intent section referring to "private individuals" in reaching its
conclusion that private activities are included within the Act. CEQA, however, makes
no mention of private individuals in its operative provisions.
15. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21001(f). See SACRAMENTo CouN Y CoDE tit. 20,
c. 20.01.
16. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21001(g).
17. CAL. PUB. RBs. CODE §21100, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433, at
2781.
18. CAL. PUB. RES. CoDE §21151, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433, at
2783.
19. CEQA provides that the impact report must set forth the following:
(a) The environmental impact of the proposed action.
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NEPA which requires federal agencies to include an EIR "in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment. ... 20
Significantly, CEQA's requirement for preparation of an EIR was
limited to cities and counties which did not have an officially adopted
conservation element in their general plan pursuant to Section 65302
of the California Government Code.2 Where such a conservation
element was included in the general plan, the local agency was required
only to make a finding that its intended project was in accord with
such conservation element. 2 However, such local agencies were re-
quired to prepare EIR's on a project-by-project basis if they received
state or federal funds for land acquisition or construction projects
which may have a significant effect on the environment.23
C. Administration and Interpretation of Statutes
CEQA, prior to the enactment of Assembly Bill 889, contained
language similar to NEPA requiring interpretation and administration
of statutes and regulations in accordance with environmental policy.24
Section 21107 of CEQA required that state agencies review their present
statutory authority, rules, and policies to determine any inconsistencies
or deficiencies in these provisions which would hinder compliance with
(b) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the pro-
posal is implemented.
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact.
(d) Alternatives to the proposed action.(e) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.
(f) Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved if the
proposed action should be implemented.
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21100, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433, at 2781. These
elements are identical to those contained in the NEPA §4332(C) except for the re-quirement (c) of mitigation measures.
20. 42 US.C. §4332(C) (1970).
21. CAL. Gov'T CoDp §65302 requires cities and counties to prepare a general
plan which consists of a general statement of development policies, objectives, prin-
ciples, standards, and proposals. Its purpose is to serve as a guide for the orderly
physical growth and development and the preservation and conservation of open space
land of the county or city and as a basis for the efficient expenditure of funds. CAL.
Gov'T CODE 65400. The general plan must include elements concerning land-use,
transportation circulation, housing, conservation, open space, noise, scenic highways,
and seismic safety. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §65302. It is in effect a constitution for all
future development within the city or county. O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 23 Cal. App. 2d
774, 782, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 (1965). The conservation element of a general plan
specifically covers the conservation, development, and utilization of natural resources
including water, forests, soils, rivers, harbors, fisheries, wildlife, minerals, and other
natural resources. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65302(a). See CONTNuiNG EDUCATION OF TiE
BAn, -CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE §2.21 (1969); Perry, Local "General Plan" in
California, 9 SAN Dmio L. REv. 1 (1971).
22. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21151, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433, at 2783.
23. CAL. Pun. REs. CoDE §21150, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433, at 2783.
24. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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CEQA.25 This section was repealed, however, by Assembly Bill
889.26
In contrast to CEQA, Section 102 of NEPA requires that its stand-
ards and policies be applied by federal agencies in their decision-
making process unless compliance is impossible or expressly prohibited
by the statute under which the agency operates. Under this view,
inconsistent agency regulations not required by the statute itself pre-
sumably would be swept away.28  The importance of this provision
is that it applies NEPA to situations in which there is no specific
"project" under consideration, but merely agency "regulations." Agen-
cies must review their policies and regulations to determine the need
for changes to bring them into compliance with NEPA. For example,
the Forest Service has modified its multiple-use planning framework
for the National Forests guided by the policy of NEPA.20 Thus agen-
cies whose statutory mandates previously did not call for attention
to environmental effects are now required to consider them. Similarly,
agencies whose mandates were primarily directed to only certain facets
of the environment now have a responsibility to incorporate the broad
policy declared in NEPA.
D. Development of Standards
CEQA charged the Office of Planning and Research, together with
the appropriate state, regional, and local agencies, with the task of
developing objectives, criteria, and procedures for the preparation of
environmental impact reports.30 Similarly, NEPA created the Council
on Environmental Quality whose main task is the study, appraisal,
and evaluation of current and prospective environmental trends and
their inter-relationship with present federal actions and programs
as well as future legislation to promote the improvement of environ-
mental quality. 31
CEQA was clearly intended by the legislature to "develop an
25. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21107, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2275.
26. It is significant to note that A.B. 889 initially amended Section 21107 to
require every public agency to review its statutory authority, rules, regulations, policies,
and procedures to determine inconsistencies with the intent, policies, and procedures
of CEQA. A.B. 889, 1972 Regular Session, as introduced, Mar. 13, 1972. This pro-
vision was deleted subsequent to the modified opinion in Friends of Mammoth. A.B.
889, 1972 Regular Session, as amended, Nov. 16, 1972.
27. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970). See 115 CONG. REc. 40418 (1969); Fisher, En-
vironmental Lawyer in the Lion's Mouth: Litigation Before and Against Administra-
tive Agencies, CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON ENViRONMENTAL LAw-T.ANscmrs oF Tm SPEECHES 63 (1971).
28. Fisher, supra note 27, at 93.
29. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 7, at 227.
30. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21103, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2275.
31. 42 U.S.C. §4344 (1970).
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orderly process that prevents environmental damage, better identifies
the true costs and consequences of . . . public and private actions,
and prevents overcommitment of . . . limited resources.1 32  However,
due to CEQA's generality and lack of firm statutory guidance for
the administration and enforcement of its provisions, the scope and
effect of the Act was not clear. Unquestionably, there is a need for
specific provisions in a statute of this nature because "[c]ourts do
not have, and will not assume, authority to review agency decisions
made within the outer limits of their statutory authorization . . .,.
As one commentator pointed out, it is doubtful California's Act offers
the rich possibilities (for environmental lawyers) as does NEPA."
THE FRIENDs OF MAMMOTH DECISION
Interpreting CEQA in Friends of Mammoth, the California Su-
preme Court held that state and local governmental agencies must
prepare EIR's for private projects requiring a government permit or
other approval if such private activities may have a significant effect
on the environment.
In Friends of Mammoth a private corporation made application
to the county planning commission for a conditional use permit for
the construction of two multi-story condominiums. The permit was
approved despite the lack of any EIR. Plaintiffs appealed the deci-
sion to the county board of supervisors, alleging that acute water and
sewage problems would be created if the defendant were permitted
to continue construction. The supervisors affirmed the planning com-
mission's issuance of the conditional use and subsequent building per-
mits. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of administrative man-
date attacking the validity of the order granting the permits under
CEQA.
The principal legal issue presented in the case was whether CEQA
applied to private activities for which a permit or other entitlement
for use is required. The dispute involved Section 21151 of the Califor-
nia Public Resources Code which required local governmental agencies
having no conservation element in their general plan to make an EIR
on any project they intended to carry out which might have a signifi-
cant effect on the environment.
The court found a legislative intent to include private activities as
well as governmental activities within the scope of the Act. In reach-
32. ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 20.
33. Morris, Environmental Statutes: The Need for Reviewable Standards, 2 ENV.
LAw 75, 81 (1971).
34. Fisher, supra note 27, at 112.
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ing this conclusion, the court, in addition to relying upon specific
terminology in CEQA,3 relied extensively on the provisions in NEPA
and its implementing guidelines.36 Particular emphasis was given to
the federal guidelines defining actions included under NEPA37 because
"the [California] Legislature obviously was aware of the federal defini-
tions when CEQA was passed."' s
In its decision the court significantly clarified the scope of CEQA's
application. First, the defendant's contention that the issuance of a
conditional use permit and a building permit were not "projects" within
the meaning of Section 21151 of the Act was rejected. In so doing,
the court relied on the wording of the federal act and regulations 0
and construed the word project to include the issuance of a lease,
permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use.40  Secondly,
the court rejected the defendant's claim that since "project" is followed
by the phrase "they intend to carry out," Section 21151 can only be
construed as referring to "public works" projects to be carried
out by the government. The court held that this phrase "mean[s]
only that before an environmental impact report becomes required the
government must have some minimal link with the activity, either by
direct proprietary interest or by permitting, regulating, or funding
[the] private activity. 41
Finally, although not directly in issue in the case, the court addressed
itself to the problem of what constitutes a "significant effect on the
environment" as that term is used in Section 21100 of the Act. The
court noted that since CEQA requires the broadest application pos-
sible, the term must not be used as, a basis to excuse the making
of impact reports. The court then defined the term to include "those
activities which have any non-trivial effect on the environment. ' 42
The Friends of Mammoth decision caused some degree of confusion
and uncertainty for developers and lending institutions as well as local
35. 8 CaL 3d at 10-11, 500 P.2d at 1366, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 22. The court stated
that the provisions of Section 21001(f), which require governmental agencies at all
levels to develop standards and procedures necessary to protect environmental quality,
necessarily include situations in which the state regulates private activity. In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on references in CEQA to "public decisions," "pri-
vate interests," and the responsibility of every citizen to contribute to environmental
preservation. CAL. PuB. RFs. CODE §§21101(d), 21000(e), 21000(f).
36. 8 Cal. 3d at 14-15, 500 P.2d at 1369-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
37. 35 FED. REG. 7390, 7391 (1970) (interim guidelines); 36 FED. REG. 7724,
7725 (1971) (final guidelines).
38. 8 Cal. 3d at 15, 500 P.2d at 1369, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
39. 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1970); 35 FED. REG. 7390, 7391 (1970); 36 FnD.
REG. 7724, 7725 (1971).
40. 8 Cal. 3d at 16, 500 P.2d at 1370, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
41. Id.
42. 8 Cal. 3d at 24 n.10, 500 P.2d at 1376 n.10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 32 n.10.
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governmental agencies. 43 Since CEQA had been applied only to pub-
lic projects, local governments faced very real problems of transition
to full implementation of the Act as interpreted in Friends of Mam-
moth.44 Much speculation arose as to what private activities were
to fall within the purview of CEQA (e.g., zoning changes, building
permits, general plan amendments, subdivision maps), what standards
were to be used to determine whether an activity has a non-trivial
effect on the environment, and perhaps most important, what projects
if any would be exempted from the holding.
The court in its modified opinion on denial of rehearing addressed
several of these issues. First, the court attempted to clarify its defini-
tion of the "significant effect on the environment" provision. As
stated previously, the original opinion had interpreted the phrase to
include activities having a non-trivial effect on the environment. In
the modified opinion the court deleted this much criticized language
and stated that, although abuse of the significant effect requirement
to avoid the application of CEQA will not be permitted, most private
projects for which governmental approval is required will, in the ab-
sence of unusual circumstances, have little or no effect on the environ-
ment and may, therefore, be approved exactly as they were prior to
the enactment of CEQA.45  Furthermore, the court stated that the
interpretation of the "significant effect" language of the Act "will thus
be fleshed out by the normal process of case-by-case adjudication."4
The apparent reason for the court's unwillingness to redefine the "sig-
nificant effect" requirement in concrete terms was its realization that
"[flurther legislative or administrative guidance may be forthcoming
on this point .... ,,47
Next, the court in its modified opinion held that it would apply
the provisions of CEQA retroactively. That is, private projects for
which governmental approval was secured prior to the court's initial
ruling would not be exempt from the judicially interpreted provisions
of CEQA. This position seems consistent with the statement of the
court in the original opinion that its interpretation of CEQA has
43. Statement by Paul E. Zigman, President, Environmental Science Associates,
to the Senate Local Government Committee, Nov. 1972, at 1.
44. See Brief of the Attorney General of the State of California as Amicus
Curiae in response to petition for rehearing at 1-3, Friends of Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Brief Amincus Curiae of the Attorney General]. For example, 300 projects
were halted in San Jose, California, due to the Friends of Mammoth decision. A num-
ber of local agencies, however, immediately established their own tentative guidelines
for the preparation and processing of the EIR backlog. Zigman, supra note 43, at 3.
45. 8 Cal. 3d at 272, 502 P.2d at 1065, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 777-
46. Id. at 271, 502 P.2d at 1065, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
47. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 5
been the law since it was enacted. Despite strong arguments urging
only prospective application of the Friends of Mammoth decision (ex-
cept where the issue of violation of iCEQA was raised at the judicial
level prior to the date of the decision) ,48 the court stated that the
appropriate statutes of limitation under local ordinances for seeking
judicial review of the local agencies' approval would in most cases
preclude attack in the courts, and that where a longer statute of limi-
tations was provided in an ordinance, the doctrine of laches might
provide the desired protection.49
Finally, the court refused to stay the effective date of its decision
to permit the affected and unprepared governmental agencies to
properly staff themselves, create the necessary administrative machin-
ery, and arrange financing to do the job demanded by CEQA. The
court gave two basic reasons for its unwillingness to grant a morato-
rium period. First, it felt that the majority of private projects covered
by the decision would not have a significant effect on the environment
and would not require impact reports. Thus it was apparently the
court's opinion that the implementation of the Friends of Mammoth
decision would not unduly burden public agencies. The court also
reasoned that since public agencies had been applying the Act to public
projects, they could draw on that experience in preparing guidelines
for application to private projects. To the extent that some delays
would result from the necessity of different guidelines for private proj-
ects, the court noted that "such delays are implicit in the Legislature's
primary decision to require preparation of a written, detailed environ-
mental impact report in precisely those cases. ' 50
ASSEMBLY BILL 889
A. Legislative Compromise
The 1972 legislative session was in several respects a landmark year
for environmental protection. The Legislative Birdwatchers, a coali-
48. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorney General, supra note 44, at 3.
49. 8 Cal. 3d at 272, 502 P.2d at 1066, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 778. In comparison,
the federal case law dealing with the effective date of NEPA has taken several ap-
proaches including: (1) NEPA is not retroactive when applied to an ongoing pro-
ject; (2) NEPA is applicable until the state of completion is reached when the costs
of abandonment or alteration would clearly outweigh the benefits therefrom; (3) NEPA
is applicable when departures from the original design are significant. See e.g., En-
vironmental Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corp of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 746 (E.D. Ark. 1971);
Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971); see also
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 232 & n.
67-68; Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 22 HAST. L.J. 805 (1971).
50. 8 Cal. 3d at 273, 502 P.2d at 1066, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
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don of environmental groups, said of the 1972 legislature, "After
three years of operations, the Legislative Birdwatchers see a brighter
environment resulting from the 1972 session."'51 Despite this opti-
mism, however, the passage of environmental legislation was frought
with opposition and compromise. Assembly Bill 889 provides a case
in point.
On March 13, 1972, prior to the ruling in Friends of Mammoth,
Assemblyman John Knox had introduced Assembly Bill 889 which
clearly was designed to bring private projects within the ambit of
CEQA.52 After the Friends of Mammoth decision, however, Assem-
bly Bill 889 became a vehicle for the various interests involved to
clarify the scope of the court's decision. The decision was vigorously
criticized as judicial lawmaking run amuck,53 and fears were ex-
pressed that the ruling would halt all building in the state. Contrac-
tors, lenders, and developers sought to delay the implementation of
the decision as well as to validate completed and ongoing projects.54
Governmental entities sought to clarify the Friends of Mammoth de-
cision relating to approval of private projects and to obtain the needed
time to establish guidelines under the court's decision. Environmental-
ists, not satisfied with the compromise provisions, attempted to preserve
the broad mandate for environmental protection expressed by the
supreme court's decision by advocating a rival measure, Assembly Bill
304.5' They maintained that Assembly Bill 889 was not "tailored
to save the environment or conservation ideals, [but rather it] has
been tailored to be acceptable." 56
The effect of these competing interests was extensive amendment
of Assembly Bill 889. Legislators, conservationists, and building in-
dustry representatives hammered out compromise provisions which
51. Final Legislative Summary-1972 Session, compiled by Senate Majority Cau-
cus Staff, Mervyn Dymally, Chairman, at 8.
52. A.B. 889, 1972 Regular Session, as introduced, Mar. 13, 1972.
53. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, PUBLIC CONTROL OF CALIFORNIA LAND
DEVELOPMENT: SUPPLEMENT TO CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE §3.81 (1973).
54. S.B. 1508, 1972 Regular Session, as amended Nov. 16, 1972. This bill pro-
vided that CEQA would not apply to private projects from the effective date of the
Act until June 1, 1973. Furthermore, it provided that private projects carried out in
whole or in part from Nov. 23, 1970, to the effective date of the Act were valid, not-
withstanding a failure to comply with the provisions of CEQA.
55. A.B. 304, 1972 Regular Session, as amended, Nov. 29, 1972. Among other
changes, this bill would have given local governmental agencies the right to adopt rules
and regulations requiring the preparation of environmental impact reports in accord-
ance with stricter standards than those provided for under CEQA.
56. Sacramento Bee, Nov. 30, 1972, at A 10, col. 3 (statement of Edwin L.
Z'Berg). Furthermore, Assemblyman Paul Priolo, author of A.B. 304, charged that
special interest lobbyists "are not just trying to smooth over the rough spots in the law
created by the Court's decision. They are literally trying to roll back California's
conservation laws to the don't-give-a-damn-about-the-environment point we were at
several years ago." Assemblyman Paul Priolo, Press Release, Nov., 1972.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 5
were not entirely satisfactory to either side. Opponents of the final
version of Assembly Bill 889 felt that it would allow private develop-
ers to push through environmentally damaging projects. Assembly-
man Knox, however, stated that the claim that "there would be a land
rush is to say all local government in California is totally irresponsi-
ble."5 7 Finally, in the late hours of the 1972 session, the final version
of Assembly Bill 889 was passed. The attempt to keep the widest
possible support and to accommodate the numerous interests resulted
in a piece of legislation not altogether complete or cohesive.
B. Private Projects
Perhaps the most important aspect of Assembly Bill 889 is that
it codifies the ruling of the supreme court in Friends of Mammoth
that CEQA applies to private as well as governmental projects. Sec-
tion 21065(c) defines the term "project" to include "[a]ctivities in-
volving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate,
or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies."' ;"
Assembly Bill 889, however, provides that EIR's shall be required
only for "discretionary projects," as opposed to "ministerial projects,"
proposed by or approved by public agencies. Discretionary projects
include, but are not limited to, the enactment and amendment of zon-
ing ordinances, the issuance of conditional use permits, and the ap-
proval of tentative subdivision maps.5 9 NEPA makes no such distinc-
tion as to the application of its provisions. The distinction is a
significant limitation of the Friends of Mammoth decision which ap-
parently required an EIR prior to an agency's decision to grant build-
ing permits which are generally considered to be ministerial in nature.10
57. Sacramento Bee, Nov. 30, 1972, at A 10, col. 3 (statement of John Knox).
58. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21065(c), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at
2271-72. Assemblyman Knox, the principal author of CEQA, has stated that in his
opinion the environmental impact report requirement of CEQA has always extended
to such private activities. JouRNAL OF THE CALIFoRNIA ASSEMBLY 2020 (Reg. Sess.
1972).
59. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21080, enacted, CAL. STAT. 1972, c. 1154, at 2272.
60. See Guidelines for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality
Act of 1970, CAL. AimuIN. CODE tit. 14, §15024, which defines "discretionary" and
"ministerial" projects. Discretionary projects are defined as projects which require the
exercise of judgment, deliberation, or decision on the part of the public agency or body
in the process of approving or disapproving a particular activity, as distinguished from
situations in which the public agency merely has to determine whether there has been
conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances, or regulations. Generally, if a prop-
erty owner complies with applicable zoning ordinances he is entitled to a building per-
Init. CONTINuING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNuA ZONING PRA~cIE §5.62 (1969).
The guidelines also recognize that in most instances the issuance of building permits
(along with business licenses, final subdivision maps, and approval of individual utility
service connections) will be ministerial in nature. CAL. ADmiN. CODE tit. 14, §15073.
For an analysis of the applicability of CEQA to local agency formation commission
(LAFCO) determinations, see Seneker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mam-
moth: Developers Chase the Will 0' The Wisp, 48 CAL. S.B.J. 127, 169 (1973).
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Such a limitation seems desirable. An EIR would have little impor-
tance in the case of ministerial acts, such as granting building permits,
since the agency has no discretion with regard to performing the act.
Consequently, requiring the preparation of an EIR in a case where
the agency's function is purely ministerial would place a heavy pro-
cedural burden in terms of cost and time on both the governmental
agency and the party applying for the permit, with no corresponding
benefit.
Prior to the approval of projects falling within the "discretionary"
category, Assembly Bill 889 provides that all public agencies shall
prepare, or cause to be prepared by contract, an EIR and certify
the completion of that report if it is determined that the project may
have a significant effect on the environment. 6 This provision is a
significant amendment of CEQA because it extends the EIR require-
ment to all cities and counties notwithstanding the fact that they have
a conservation element in their general plan. Previously, only those
local agencies which did not have a conservation element as part
of their general plan were required to prepare an EIR.62
It would seem that requiring all local agencies to submit Elk's re-
moves a major problem area from CEQA. First, it encourages uni-
form consideration of the environmental factors and consequences of
a proposed project. Previously, some local agencies were required
to measure the environmental impact of a project against the require-
ments of CEQA, while others were allowed to use as a measure the
standards of an officially adopted general plan. Secondly, while there
has been extensive case law interpreting the requirement of both fed-
eral and state impact reports, 63 there appears to be no judicial decision
interpreting the requirements of a local conservation element, its ade-
quacy, or its relationship to an impact statement.
C. Significant Effect on the Environment-Guidelines
As previously discussed, the court in Friends of Mammoth failed
to specifically define what constitutes a significant effect on the envi-
ronment.6 4 The significant effect requirement is extremely important,
61. CAL. PUB. Rns. CODE §§21100, 21151, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c.
1154, at 2274, 2276.
62. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra. This provision was criticized
by conservationists since it exempted a great number of cities and counties from the
environmental impact report requirement.
63. See e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water District, 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 197 (1972).
64. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
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however, because it is the initial determination that must be made
for all projects under CEQA. The important contribution that
Assembly Bill 889 makes in this area is that it specifies certain condi-
tions which shall require a finding of significant effect on the environ-
ment. These conditions are: (1) the potential to degrade the quality
of the environment, curtail the range of the environment, or to achieve
short-term, to the disadvantage of long-term, environmental goals; (2)
possible effects of a project which are individually limited but cum-
ulatively considerable; and (3) effects which will cause substantial
adverse effects on human beings, either directly or indirectly.0 5 As-
sembly Bill 889 also directed that guidelines for the implementation
of the Act be developed by the Office of Planning and Research and
certified and adopted by the Secretary of the Resources Agency.00
A potential problem is created by the fact that the guidelines
adopted by the Secretary of the Resources Agency differ from Assem-
bly Bill 889 in their definition of what constitutes a significant effect
on the environment. The guidelines provide, "An iron-clad definition
of significant effect is not possible because the significance of an ac-
tivity may vary with the setting."67  However, they go on to define
significant effect as meaning a substantial adverse impact on the en-
vironment.68  Thus according to the guidelines, an EIR need be pre-
pared only where the agency determines that the project will have
an adverse impact rather than merely a significant effect on the envi-
ronment as required by Assembly Bill 889.
This provision of the guidelines has been severely criticized in sev-
eral respects. 69 First, it limits the impact report requirement to cases
in which the environmental consequences of a project are deemed
"bad" or "undesirable" by the public agency involved. Beneficial proj-
ects would in effect be exempted. The fact that a project may have
only beneficial effects, however, should not be determinative, since
the alternative approaches to the project may be even more environ-
mentally beneficial and involve fewer economic or technical prob-
lems.70
65. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §21083(a),(b),(c), enacted, CAL. STATs. 1972, c.
1154, at 2272-73.
66. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21083, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2272.
The guidelines for CEQA were adopted by the Secretary of the Resources Agency on
1973.67. CAL. ADMI'N. CODE tit. 14, §15081(a).
68. CAL. ADmrN. CODE tit. 14, §15040.
69. See Attorney General's Memorandum, Analysis of CEQA Guidelines Is-
sued by the Resources Agency on Feb. 5, 1973 (Aug. 24, 1973).
70. See Comment, The Compatibility of Economic and Environmental Objec-
tives in Governmental Decision Making, this volume at 92.
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By comparison, the guidelines adopted pursuant to NEPA provide
that "[p]roposed actions, the environmental impact of which is likely
to be highly controversial, should be covered in all cases.' 1 Indeed,
a federal district court in Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney
72
held that an environmental impact statement must be prepared even
where the agency believes that the environmental effects will be bene-
ficial. The court expressly stated that even though a project may
benefit rather than degrade the surrounding environment, this "does
not mean that the project will not have a significant impact upon
the quality of the. . environment. .. .
Therefore, under the present CEQA guidelines a public agency
conceivably could avoid the costly and time-consuming task of prepar-
ing an EIR by making an initial qualitative judgment that a project
will be beneficial to the environment. It would seem, however, that
in this respect the guidelines are contrary to the spirit of CEQA and
the warning of the Friends of Mammoth decision that abuse of the
significant effect requirement to avoid the application of CEQA will
not be permitted. The mandate of CEQA requires not only protec-
tion of the environment but also affirmative enhancement of the envi-
ronment. Such affirmative enhancement necessarily includes close
scrutiny of beneficial projects to insure that such projects are the most
desirable and beneficial to the environment.
D. Categorical Exemptions
Assembly Bill 889 requires the guidelines to include a list of classes
of projects which have been determined not to have a significant effect
on the environment and which shall be exempt from the provisions
of CEQA.74  In response to this mandate the Secretary of the Re-
sources Agency included a list of nine classes of projects which he
has found not to have a significant effect on the environment. 75
The validity of the categorical exemptions provided by the guidelines
is being challenged in Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Liver-
more.76 The first objection is that in establishing the exemptions the
Secretary of the Resources Agency has not made a proper finding
as to why certain classes of projects are exempt. Petitioners contend
71. 36 FED. REG. 7724 (1971).
72. 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
73. Id. at 879.
74. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21084, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2273.
75. CAL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 14, §15100 et seq.
76. California Supreme Court, petition for writ of mandate, Civil No. LA 30168
(filed July 29, 1973). The Supreme Court has denied the petition for mandate without
opinion. Petitioners have since refiled the case in the Third District Court of Ap-
peals.
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that "[t]he lack of a contemporaneous written record regarding these
exemptions makes it very difficult indeed 'to ascertain the principles
relied upon' by the Secretary."7  They further contend that "it would
appear there was very little 'reasoned analysis' behind the Secretary's
broad conclusion that none of the classes of projects exempted may
have a significant effect on the environment. '17
The second objection to the categorical exemptions is that they are
overbroad. The major problem is in regard to the sections of the
guidelines which exempt actions by regulatory agencies to assure the
maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of a natural re-
source or of the environment.7 9 Petitioners claim these provisions
could exempt all pesticide control programs, all zoning activities, and
all other governmental programs supposedly designed to protect nat-
ural resources or the environment. This position is also taken by
the Attorney General who has stated that these sections "appear to
exempt virtually all actions taken by all regulatory agencies throughout
the State. '8 0  Clearly, this is not authorized by CEQA.
In the Proposed Amendments to Guidelines for Implementation of
the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, two sections
have been amended to provide a categorical exemption for the actions
of regulatory agencies involving enhancement of natural resources or
the environment "where the regulatory process involves detailed pro-
cedures for protection of the environment.""' Also, the proposed
amendment specifically excludes construction activities from these ex-
emptions.
Apparently, these amendments to the guidelines are an attempt to
limit the scope of the categorical exemptions relating to regulatory
actions. However, they do not appear entirely satisfactory. Many
regulatory actions, other than for construction, are still exempted from
CEQA. Furthermore, merely requiring that the regulatory process
involve detailed procedures for protection of the environment does
not insure that such procedures will be consistent with the policy of
CEQA.
E. The Guidelines: Lead Agency and Other Provisions
Assembly Bill 889 adds the concept of a "lead agency" to the
77. Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Mandate at 27, Center for Law in the Public
Interest v. Livermore, Civil No. LA 30168 (filed July 29, 1973).
78. Id. at 27-28.
79. CAL. ADmiN. CODE tit. 14, §§15107, 15108.
80. Attorney General's Memorandum, supra note 69, at 5.
81. Secretary for Resources, Proposed Amendments to Guidelines For Implemen-
tation of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, at 15 (Aug. 31, 1973).
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provisions of CEQA. Lead agency is defined as the public agency
which has the principal responsibility for carrying out or approving
a project which may have a significant effect upon the environment.8
The state guidelines adopted pursuant to Assembly Bill 889 state that
"[w]here a project is to be carried out or approved by more than
one public agency, only one EIR . . . shall be made, and it will be
prepared by the Lead Agency. '88
This addition to CEQA parallels NEPA's guidelines which provide:
The lead agency should prepare an environmental statement
if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact
on the environment from Federal action. 'Lead agency' refers
to the Federal agency which has primary authority for committing
the Federal Government to a course of action with significant en-
vironmental impact. As necessary, the Council on Environmental
Quality will assist in resolving questions of lead agency determina-
tion.84
The guidelines adopted pursuant to Assembly Bill 889 provide similar
principles for the determination of the lead agency. Generally, the
lead agency is the public agency which proposes to carry out the proj-
ect,8 or, in the case of private projects, the public agency with the
greatest responsibility for supervising or approving the project as a
whole.88 If two public agencies equally fulfill these requirements, the
guidelines provide that the agency which is to act first on the project
in question shall be the lead agency. 7 In case of disputes, the Office
of Planning and Research shall designate the lead agency.8 8
Also, the guidelines may provide that when an environmental impact
statement has or will be prepared for the same project pursuant to
NEPA, it may be submitted in lieu of an EIR required under CEQA. 9
Although the elements in an impact statement under NEPA differ
slightly from those included in an impact report under CEQA,90 the
guidelines recognize this problem and provide that where an impact
statement under NEPA is used in lieu of an impact report under
82. CAL. PuB. REs. CoDE §21067, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2272.
83. CAL. ADmiN. CODE tit. 14, §15064.
84. 36 FED. REG. 7724-25 (1971). It should be noted that the lead agency con-
cept is not mentioned in NEPA itself. Rather, it is a concept developed by the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality.
85. CAL. ADmIn. CODE tit. 14, §15065(a).
86. CL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 14, §15065(b).
87. CAL. ADmin. CODE tit. 14, §15065(c).
88. CAL. ADMn. CODE tit. 14, §15065(d). For a criticism of the lead agency
concept as applied to NEPA, see Humphreys, NEPA and Multi-Agency Actions-Is the
"Lead Agency" Concept Valid?, 6 NAT. Rug. LAW. 257 (1973).
89. CAL. Pun. Rus. CODE §21083.5, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2273.
90. See note 19 supra.
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CEQA those elements missing in the NEPA report will have to be
added."
Assembly Bill 889 further requires that once a list of exempt classes
of projects has been prepared and adopted pursuant to Section 21084,
a public agency may at any time request the addition or deletion of
a class of projects to the list.92 Furthermore, the Office of Planning
and Research is directed to periodically review the guidelines and rec-
ommend proposed changes or amendments.93 The Secretary of the
Resources Agency is authorized to provide for publication of a bulle-
tin to give public notice of the guidelines and of the completion
of environmental impact reports prepared pursuant to the Act.94
F. Contents of EIR's and Procedures for Review
As previously mentioned, Section 21100 of CEQA delineates those
matters to which an environmental impact report must address itself. 5
Assembly Bill 889 adds to Section 21100 one significant inquiry which
must be included in an EIR-inquiry into the growth-inducing impact
of the proposed action.96  The significance of this addition is that
it appears to address questions other than the purely physical impact
of a proposed project-questions such as the social and economic ef-
fects of the project.
With respect to the procedures to be followed by state and local
agencies in preparing and reviewing EIR's, Assembly Bill 889 requires
that prior to completing an EIR every local agency must consult with
and obtain comments from any public agency which has jurisdiction
with respect to the project. Local agencies may also consult with
any person who has special expertise in the particular area of con-
cern.
97
Section 21160 authorizes public agencies to require any person ap-
plying for a lease, permit, license, or other entitlement for use to submit
any data and information which will, first, enable the agency to deter-
mine whether the project may have a significant effect on the environ-
91. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15063.
92. CAL.. PuB. REs. CODE §21086, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2273.
93. CAL. Pur. RES. CODE §21087, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2274.
94. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21088, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2274.
As of this writing such a bulletin has not been published.
95. See note 19 supra.
96. The guidelines provide that included within this inquiry are the ways in
which the proposed project could foster economic or population growth, either directly
or indirectly in the surrounding environment. A major expansion of a waste treatment
plant might, for example, allow for more construction in service areas and thus in-
crease the population in that area. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15143(g).
97. CAL. Put. REs. CODE §21104, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at
2275.
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ment and, secondly, if necessary, enable the agency to prepare an
EIR.98  A protective limitation on this authorization is that if any
or all of the information required is a trade secreta9 it need not be
included in the report or otherwise disclosed.100
Finally, Assembly Bill 889 and the guidelines provide that once
an EIR has been prepared, no subsequent EIR is required unless: (1)
substantial changes are contemplated in the project due to the involve-
ment of new environmental impacts not considered in the original re-
port;10 1 or (2) substantial changes occur with respect to the circum-
stances under which the project is being undertaken. 0 2 What is "sub-
stantial" is not defined in the Act or the guidelines. The guidelines do,
however, indicate that a change in the proposed location of the project
would be substantial.
G. Statute of Limitations
Assembly Bill 889 provides specified limitation periods for challeng-
ing acts or decisions of public agencies on grounds of noncompliance
with the provisions of CEQA. Previously, no such periods of limita-
tion were provided in CEQA. If an action alleges that a public agency
is carrying out or has approved a project without determining whether
the project may have a significant effect on the environment, Section
21167(a) provides that the challenging action or proceeding must
be commenced within 180 days of the agency's decision or, if the
project is undertaken without formal decision by the agency, then
within 180 days from the date of commencement of the project.'03
If the allegation is that there has been an improper determination as
to whether or not a project may have a significant effect on the envi-
ronment, the challenging action or proceeding must be commenced
within 30 days after filing of the notice of approval of the project
98. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21160, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2276-77.
99. Defined by Section 6254.7 of the California Public Records Act. CAL.
GOV'T CODE §6250 et seq. The effect of this section is to include within the defini-
tion of trade secret certain information relating to air pollution data. Such trade se-
crets do not constitute public records. Section 6254.7 has been amended by S.B. 156
to include air pollution emission data, including data which constitutes a trade secret,
within the definition of public records. Information constituting trade secrets used to
calculate such emission data, however, are not public records. S.B. 156, CAL. STATS.
1973, c. 186.
100. CA.. PuB. REs. CODE §21160, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2276-
77.
101. CAL. PUB. Rns. CODE §21166(a), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at
2277; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15067(a).
102. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21166(b), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at
2277; CAL. AnMrN. CODE tit. 14, §15067(b).
103. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21167(a), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at
2277-78.
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with the county clerk or the Secretary of the Resources Agency. 0 4
Finally, if the allegation is that an EIR does not comply with the
provisions of CEQA, then the challenging proceeding must be com-
menced within 30 days of the filing of the notice of approval of the
project.10 5
As set forth above, it is apparent that Assembly Bill 889 does ad-
dress itself to a number of significant areas of concern and confusion
with regard to the application of CEQA as it was interpreted by the
Friends of Mammoth decision. However, because of the urgent neces-
sity of clarifying legislation and the legislature's attempt to reach a
satisfactory compromise, Assembly Bill 889 has created some prob-
lems in the application and administration of CEQA.
POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS
A. Substantive Rights
A continuing question in relation to CEQA is whether it creates
substantive as well as procedural rights. More specifically, does
CEQA add to the statutory mandate of state and local agencies so
as to require such agencies to deny or condition approval of a "project"
based upon the likelihood that the project will have a deleterious effect
on the environment?
Although Assembly Bill 889 does not specifically address itself to
this issue, it does provide that an EIR is "an informational document
which . . . shall be considered by every public agency prior to its
approval or disapproval of a project."''1 6 The purpose of such reports
is to provide public agencies with detailed information about the ef-
fect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment,
to list ways in which any adverse effects of such a project might be
minimized, and to suggest alternatives to such a project.107
The provisions of Sections 21108 (relating to state agencies) and
21152 (relating to local agencies) indicate that public agencies have
the power to approve projects notwithstanding a significant effect on
the environment. They provide for a notice of determination to
be filed for projects subject to CEQA which a public agency approves
or determines to carry out. This notice is filed after a final decision
is made on a project. Furthermore, those sections state that "such
notice shall indicate whether the project will, or will not, have a sig-
104. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21167(b), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, r. 1154, at 2278.
105. CAL. Pm. REs. CODE §21167(c), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, at 2278.
106. A.B. 889, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, §1, at 2271.
107. Id.
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nificant effect on the environment. . . ."'I' Thus apparently a proj-
ect may have a significant effect on the environment and still be ap-
proved by the public agency.
The guidelines prepared by the Secretary of Resources also address
this question. They provide, "[N]or do indications of adverse impact,
as enunciated in an EIR, require that a project be disapproved-public
agencies retain existing authority to balance environmental objectives
with economic and social objectives."'1 9  Furthermore, they state,
"Attention should be paid to alternatives capable of substantially re-
ducing or eliminating any environmentally adverse impacts . . .""I
Similarly, in the Friends of Mammoth decision the court stated that
the environmental impact report will provide input "in the ultimate
governmental decision based, in part, on that report.""' It would
seem that such language in the Act, the guidelines, and the Friends
of Mammoth decision indicates that an agency can approve a project
notwithstanding an adverse environmental impact. If so, it is not clear
under what circumstances an agency may exercise this authority.
It could be argued that CEQA does in effect create substantive
rights through the imposition of numerous procedural safeguards. In
this regard, the court in Friends of Mammoth did allude to the ex-
tent which environmental considerations should enter into an agency's
decision-making process. The court stated, "Obviously if the adverse
consequences to the environment can be mitigated, or if feasible alter-
natives are available, the proposed activity, such as the issuance of
a permit, should not be approved.""12 Furthermore, the court warned,
In making these determinations [as to mitigation and alternatives],
concrete concepts, not mere aphorisms or generalities, must be
considered ....
The report, therefore, is to contain substantially greater analysis
of the effect of the proposed activity on the environment and the
possible mitigation devices and alternatives than can be achieved
108. CAL. Pun. Rlis. CODE §§21108, 21152, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154,
at 2275-76 (emphasis added).
109. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15012. This provision of the guidelines is cur-
rently being challenged. See note 76 supra.
The proposed amendments to the guidelines delete the language in Section 15012
relating to retention of existing authority by public agencies. They add the follow-
ing language: "While CEQA requires that major consideration be given to preventing
environmental damage, public agencies must also weigh other public objectives, includ-
ing economic and social factors, in determining whether and how a project should be
approved. Economic information may be included in an EIR or may be presented in
whatever form the agency desires." Proposed Amendments to Guidelines, supra note
81, at 1.
110. CAL. ADmmI. CoDE-tit. 14, §15143(d).
111. 8 CaL 3d at 16 n.8, 50 P.2d at 1371 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 27 n.8 (emphasis
added).
112. Id.
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simply through testimony followed by a naked conclusion that the
environment will not be harmed by the project."13
Several federal cases interpreting NEPA provide further guidance
on this issue. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic
Energy Commission"14 the court stated,
What possible purpose could there be in requiring the 'detailed
statement' . . . if the boards are free to ignore entirely the con-
tents of the statement? NEPA was meant to do more than regu-
late the flow of papers in the federal bureaucracy." 5
Furthermore, a federal district court has stated,
If the Act is seen as requiring only full disclosure, it will simply
become a minor nuisance for agencies, imposing one more obliga-
tion of paperwork before they can get on with the projects they
intend to build.'1 6
Perhaps the most significant federal decision in this area is Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers.17  In that case the eighth
circuit held that NEPA does create judicially enforceable substantive
rights by which an agency's decision may be reviewed to determine
if it is substantially in compliance with the policy of NEPA. Circuit
Judge Matthes indicated,
The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it
clear that the Act is more than an environmental full-disclosure
law. NEPA was intended to effect substantive changes in deci-
sion making . . . [and] to require agencies to consider and give
effect to the environmental goals set forth in the Act, not just to
fill government archives."18
Although there is conflict among the cases on this issue, recogni-
tion of enforceable substantive rights in NEPA seems to represent a
significant trend among the federal courts. Applying this reasoning
to the EIR process under CEQA could potentially mean the invalida-
tion of projects where the EIR discloses adverse effects that could
be mitigated or avoided but the public agency fails to require mitiga-
tion or the use of feasible alternatives.
This precise question was raised on appeal to the First District Court
of Appeal in the case of Burger v. County of Mendocino."09 In
113. Id.
114. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
115. ld. at 1117.
116. Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972).
117. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
118. Id. at 297-98.
119. Superior Court No. C33238 (Mendocino Super. Ct., filed Sept. 29, 1972),
appeal docketed, 1 Civil 32455, Dec. 21, 1972. The case was remanded to the Su-
perior Court on procedural grounds without a consideration of this issue by the First
District Court.
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that case the real party in interest proposed to build an 80-unit motel,
bar, and restaurant on a 12-acre site. The county granted a build-
ing permit for the project, and the action was challenged by petitioner
alleging that the project would require the preparation of an EIR.
Pursuant to the superior court ruling that an EIR was necessary, an
impact statement was prepared and submitted to the respondent
county. The report recommended that an alternative project be ap-
proved, that further studies should be conducted to determine the feasi-
bility of a waste disposal system, and that there were several other
unanswered questions which should prevent the approval of the origi-
nal project. Despite this adverse impact, the county reaffirmed its
approval of the project. In an amicus curiae brief in support of the
petitioner, the Attorney General contended that in light of the language
in the Friends of Mammoth decision the action of the county in reaf-
firming the project without requiring mitigating alternatives must be
set aside as an abuse of discretion. 120
Given the supreme court's apparent attitude regarding the imposi-
tion of mitigating conditions or the use of feasible alternatives, and
the failure of CEQA and its implementing guidelines to adequately
address this problem, it would seem that clarifying legislation is neces-
sary. One attempt at such clarification is Senate Bill 1051 which
contains two significant provisions. First, it would amend Section
21001 (the policy statement of CEQA) to provide in part that "it
is the policy of the state to . . . [e]nsure that the long-term protection
of the environment shall be a principal guiding criterion in public
decisions."12  This language is somewhat less emphatic than the pres-
ent statement of policy in CEQA which makes environmental protec-
tion the guiding criterion in public decisions. Secondly, Senate Bill
1051, in proposing the addition of Section 21091 to CEQA, ex-
pressly states that no provision of CEQA shall be construed to require
the approval or disapproval by a public agency of a project solely
on the basis of information contained in an EIR.122  Such language
would seem to settle the issue of whether an agency may approve
a project even though the EIR indicates a significant adverse effect
on the environment. At present, however, it does not seem likely
that Senate Bill 1051 will be enacted into law due to opposition by
environmental groups.
120. Brief of the State of California as Arnicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
19, Burger v. County of Mendocino, 1 Civil 32455, Dec. 27, 1972.
121. S.B. 1051, 1973-74 Regular Session, introduced, Apr. 26, 1973, by Senator
Bradley, as amended, June 11, 1973.
122. Id.
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Resolution of this issue by the legislature may prove difficult due
to the many diverse interests which are involved. Perhaps the initial
clarification, like the Friends of Mammoth decision, must come from
the courts. In any case, a balance must be achieved between the
fundamental interest of the state in environmental protection and the
reality and necessity of development in a technological and ever-ex-
panding society. It would seem, however, that such a balance is pro-
vided for under the existing law. Not only must agencies consider
the environmental impact of a proposed project as well as alternatives
to reduce adverse impacts, but economic and technical factors must
also be considered. Additionally, the sponsor's justification for the
proposed project is considered. By allowing agencies to approve proj-
ects notwithstanding a significant adverse impact, and without impos-
ing mitigation measures or alternatives, the environmental policy of
the state would amount to little more than mere verbage.123
B. Preparation of the EIR
Prior to the enactment of Assembly Bill 889, CEQA provided that
the responsible local agency was to prepare the EIR.124  The responsi-
bility for preparation rested solely on the governmental level since only
governmental activities were subjected to the provisions of CEQA.
However, since the Friends of Mammoth decision applied CEQA to
private projects, there is a question as to what extent the duty to pre-
pare the report and the costs of preparation may be delegated to the
private developer or proponent of the project.
Sections 21100 and 21151, as amended by Assembly Bill 889, make
it clear that the public agency itself may prepare an EIR or may cause
one to be prepared by contract. 125  Also, Section 21089 provides that
the public agency may charge and collect a reasonable fee from the
proponent of a project in order to recover the estimated costs incurred
in preparing an EIR.2'2
123. An alternative to the substantive rights theory was proposed by the Lawyers
Club of Los Angeles County at the 1973 Conference of Delegates of the California
State Bar. This approach would include within the statutory definition of nuisance
anything which constitutes pollution or impairment or destruction of the natural re-
sources of the state. Furthermore, it would create a rebuttable presumption that viola-
tions of environmental statutes, such as CEQA, constitute a nuisance. STATE BAR O
CALIFoRNA, 1973 CoNFEN CE RESOLuTION 9-7. Apparently, under this theory, an
agency's approval of an environmentally damaging project could be invalidated on the
grounds that it constitutes a public nuisance. The desirability of this approach is
questionable because it would create great uncertainty with respect to all govern-
mental decisions which could affect the environment.'
124. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21150, enacted,' CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433, at 2782.
125 CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§21100, 21151, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c.
1154, at 2274, 2276.
126. CAL. PuB. Rns. CoDE §21089, enacted, CAL. STAT. 1972, c. 1154, at 2274.
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These provisions raise several issues. First, do Sections 21100 and
21151 authorize a public agency to contract with the proponent of
a project to prepare the required EIR? With regard to NEPA, a
federal case has held that the responsible agency itself must prepare
the impact statement. 2 7 The court stated,
The primary and nondelegable responsibility for fulfilling that
function lies with the [agency] ....
If this course of action ...were not followed, alternatives
might be lost as the applicant's statement tended to produce a
status quo syndrome' 281
Furthermore, CEQA's guidelines authorize nongovernmental persons
to submit a draft ElR, but the responsible agency must examine this
draft and the information contained therein to assure its accuracy and
objectivity and must amend the draft if necessary. Therefore, it ap-
pears that the task of preparing an EIR cannot be completely delegated
to the proponent of the project under consideration. 129
Further clarification on this issue is being sought in Center for Law
in the Public Interest v. Livermore.3 0  Petitioners contend that Sec-
tion 15085(a) of the guidelines, relating to the public agency's respon-
sibility where a draft EIR is prepared by the applicant, is invalid.
Petitioners argue that Section 15085(a) would allow the agency to
reach the "naked conclusion" that a draft EIR is "accurate and objec-
tive" without developing a written record as to how that conclusion
is reached.' 3' While the guidelines state that the final EIR must re-
flect the independent judgment of the responsible agency,13' there is
no corresponding provision with regard to draft EI's. Since the ma-
terial contained in the draft impact report may provide important re-
source material for the final EIR, the public agency should make its
own independent analysis and judgment of the applicant's draft EIR.
Another alternative to preparing the report is that public agencies
could contract with independent environmental consultants. This ap-
proach also has some drawbacks. From an economic standpoint, the
proponent of the project may have to bear substantial costs for the
preparation of the EIR. 138 Furthermore, a conflict may arise in the
127. Green County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d. 412
(2d Cir. 1972).
128. Id. at 420-21.
129. See Kane, Friends of Mammoth: The Expanding Scope of Environmental
Law in California, 48 L.A. BAR BULL. 81, 105 (1973); Seneker, supra note 60, at 176.
130. ACivil No. LA 30168 (filed July 29, 1973). See note 76 supra.
131. Petitioners Brief for Writ of Mandate at 29, Center for Law in the Public
Interest v. Livermore, Civil No. LA 30168, July 30, 1973.
132. CAL. ADnmN. CoDEtit. 14, §15085(a).
133. The Department of Water Resources has prepared an EIR cost guideline
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situation where the public agency contracts with an environmental
consultant to prepare an EIR. The preparation of an EIR requires
close contact and cooperation between the environmental consultant
and the developer. If this cooperation cannot be achieved because
the particular consulting firm retained by the public agency is not
acceptable to the developer, the preparation of the EIR may be sub-
stantially delayed or may not present a true picture of the particular
project in question. Similarly, since the environmental consultant is
essentially serving two "masters" a conflict of loyalty may result.
Therefore, it would seem desirable where the public agency contracts
with an environmental consultant to prepare the report that the private
developer be included in this decision-making process.
Closely related to the issue of who must prepare the impact report
under CEQA is the problem of licensing environmental consultants.
The expanding application of CEQA has greatly increased the demand
for qualified environmental consultants to advise and in many cases
actually prepare ER's for private developers and public agencies. Pres-
ently, however, there are no licensing requirements imposed upon en-
vironmental consultants to insure that they are qualified to adequately
assess the environmental implications of proposed projects. Environ-
mental planning calls for broad interdisciplinary expertise because of
the complex social, physical, and ecological aspects of the environment.
Thus a consultant firm must have expertise in a wide range of techni-
cal areas, such as ecology, forestry, land use planning, and water
resources to name just a few. Because of this need for diversity, how-
ever, it is difficult to set forth general yet meaningful and effective
standards for licensing environmental consultants. Preparing an EIR
requires, as a minimum, expertise in the fields of local and regional
planning, engineering, ecology and ecosystems, and economic analy-
sis.
Since the content of an EIR may determine the fate of a proposed
project, and indeed the future of the environment, it is essential that
they are prepared by qualified personnel. The implementation of a
licensing procedure for environmental consultants would help to insure
this necessary level of expertise.
C. Regional Considerations-Constitutional Mandate
Both Assembly Bill 889 and the guidelines are somewhat vague
in terms of defining what consideration a local agency must give to
which suggests an initial fee for the preparation of an EIR in relation to the esti-
mated capital cost of the proposed project.
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the possible adverse effects of a project on areas outside its jurisdic-
tional boundaries. The guidelines provide that an EIR must describe
the environmental setting of a project from both local and regional
perspectives. 34  Furthermore, they instruct that "[k]nowledge of the
regional setting is critical to the assessment of environmental im-
pacts."'1 5 These provisions, however, do not mandate a city, for ex-
ample, to consider the impact of a project on the environment of a
neighboring city. Thus a project which is beneficial within the bound-
aries of one agency may be approved notwithstanding possible adverse
impacts on adjacent areas.
It could be argued, however, that restricting the consideration of
the environmental effects of a proposed project to the boundaries
of the particular agency (i.e., the city or county) is an unconstitutional
denial of due process. In Scott v. City of Indian Wells 36 the plaintiffs
filed a class action seeking a declaratory judgment voiding the city's
grant of a conditional use permit to construct a large planned develop-
ment on land lying just within the city limits. Plaintiffs owned neigh-
boring land situated just outside the city limits. Plaintiffs were not
given notice of the hearing before the planning commission to consider
the granting of a conditional use permit to construct a development
consisting of two golf courses, tennis courts, clubhouses, 675 condo-
miniums, and 90 individual lots.
The California Supreme Court held unanimously that the plaintiffs
had standing to contest a municipality's zoning even though they are
not residents of the municipality' 37 and that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment requires that non-city residents be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the proposed develop-
ment with respect to its effect on all neighboring property owners.' 38
Although the Scott case dealt primarily with a municipal zoning
ordinance, the language of the case would seem equally applicable
to the consideration of environmental impact reports by local public
agencies. The court stated,
In today's sprawling metropolitan complexes, however, municipal
boundary lines rarely indicate where urban development ceases
To hold, under these circumstances, that defendant city may
zone the land within its border without any concern for adjacent
landowners would indeed "make a fetish out of invisible municipal
134. CAL. ADmiN. CODE tit. 14, §15142.
135. Id.
136. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
137. Id. at 549, 492 P.2d at 1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
138. Id.
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boundary lines and a mockery of the principles of zoning."
"[C]ommon sense and wise public policy . . . require an oppor-
tunity for property owners to be heard before ordinances which
substantially affect their property rights are adopted. ... 10
Furthermore, the court imposed a duty on the city to consider the
proposed development with respect to its effect on all neighboring
property owners. 140
An agency's action in approving or denying a proposed project
based on an, EIR would clearly affect substantial property interests
of those situated outside the agency's physical boundaries. Indeed,
the construction project in Scott would under present law be subject
to the EIR requirement of CEQA. Therefore, an argument could
be made that limiting an EIR's consideration of the impact of a proj-
ect to the physical boundaries of an agency without hearing and consid-
ering the opinions of those who will be affected but who are outside
the physical jurisdiction of the particular agency is a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
D. The Guidelines-Negative Decidations
As previously discussed, Assembly Bill 889 granted the Secretary
of the Resources Agency together with the Office of Planning and
Research broad discretion in developing objectives and criteria for the
implementation of CEQA. Whenever an administrative agency is
delegated such authority, the question arises as to whether the agency
has exceeded its statutory authority in its attempt to implement the
underlying statute. The guidelines adopted pursuant to CEQA pose
some problems in this respect. 4'
The guidelines provide for the preparation of a "negative declara-
tion" for projects which would ordinarily be expected to have a signifi-
cant effect on the environment but which the agency finds will have
no significant effect due to the circumstances of the particular proj-
ect.' 42  This procedure, which is not specifically authorized by
CEQA, weeds out projects where an initial study by the public
agency determines that the full EIR procedure is not warranted.
The guidelines, however, state that the negative declaration should
not exceed one page in length'4 3 and should contain a description
139. Id. at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749, citing Kissinger v. City of
Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 464, 327 P.2d 10, 17 (1958).
140. 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
141. See text accompanying notes 67-81 supra.
142. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15083.
143. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15083(b).
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of the project and a finding that the project will not have a significant
effect on the environment.144  This provision appears to be totally
inconsistent with the spirit of CEQA. The purpose of CEQA is
to provide full disclosure and detailed informatio about the effect
which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment. Limit-
ing the content of a negative declaration by sanctioning an arbitrary
limit on its length does not seem to stimulate the free flow of informa-
tion about a project.
Furthermore, such a limitation on the negative declaration would
seem to invite environmental mistakes. That is, an erroneous initial
study by a public agency may be totally overlooked merely because
the negative declaration did not contain an adequate record of why
the determination was made. With respect to NEPA the federal courts
have sanctioned the negative declaration procedure but with the warn-
ing that perfunctory negative declarations should be avoided. A re-
viewable, even if not lengthy, record to substantiate the decision is
required under the NEPA.145
Therefore, although the guidelines do not require that a negative
declaration be limited to one page, they do sanction such a conclusion-
ary report. Similarly, the proposed amendments to the guidelines in-
clude the same recommendation on length but require that the nega-
tive declaration contain a "brief statement of reasons to support the
findings."'146  The emphasis, however, is still on conclusions. Al-
though a negative declaration need not be as detailed in its analysis
as an impact report, it would seem desirable that the negative declara-
tion contain a substantially greater analysis of the environmental im-
pact of a project than is presently required.
CONCLUSION
In the Friends of Mammoth decision, the California Supreme Court
stated with respect to the CEQA:
In an era of commercial and industrial expansion in which the
environment has been repeatedly violated by those who are oblivi-
ous to the ecological well-being of society, the significance of this
legislative act cannot be understated.147
This comment has attempted to analyze California's Environmental
Quality Act of 1970 in light of the recent legislative and judicial
144. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15083(a).
145. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
146. Proposed Amendments to Guidelines, supra note 81, at 10.
147. 8 Cal. 3d at 8, 500 P.2d at 1365, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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attempts to assure that important environmental purposes are "not lost
or misdirected in the vast hallways of. .. bureaucracy."' 4
Assembly Bill 889 has succeeded in significantly expanding the
scope and effectiveness of CEQA. Private projects have been brought
within the scope of the CEQA, and greater guidance has been af-
forded local and state agencies in implementing its provisions. There
is, however, still further need of legislative and administrative clarifi-
cation in the areas of a local agency's power to approve projects which
may have a significant effect on the environment without requiring
mitigation or the use of feasible alternatives, and discrepancies between
the provisions of CEQA and its implementing guidelines.
Concededly, the problems discussed herein are not exhaustive;
however, they are indicative of the types of problems and issues which
face public agencies, developers, environmentalists, and ultimately the
courts and legislature in the area of environmental protection in Cali-
fornia. To the extent that the solutions to these problems and others
like them can be achieved, the Environmental Quality Act of 1970
will truly have a significant effect in protecting and enhancing the qual-
ity of the human environment.
Stephen H. Johanson
148. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
